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Executive Summary 
This report provides background 
information and evidence-based 
answers in response to questions posed 
by an Illinois legislator. The questions 
are: (1) Can you describe the income 
distribution in Illinois and how this has 
evolved over the recent past? (2) Can you 
project out the income distribution in 
Illinois for the next five years and project 
personal income tax revenue with: (a) 
Illinois’ current personal income tax 
system? (b) a graduated rate personal 
income tax system comparable to 
other Midwestern states (i.e. Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, Iowa or Missouri)? (3) What 
personal income tax revenue would 
Illinois’ economy generate if it adopted 
the personal income tax structure of 
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa or Missouri? 
(4) How are tax burdens distributed in 
the current tax system and how would 
they be different under alternative tax 
systems in the question above? 
In order to answer questions (1) and 
(2) our report provides an analysis 
of the current and historical income 
distributions of Illinois taxpayers along 
with forecasts of how the income 
distribution will change over the next 
five years. There is a concern among 
some legislators that an increase in 
income inequality will have a negative 
impact on the Illinois tax system. We 
first reviewed the historical evolution 
in the Illinois income distribution using 
data from the Internal Revenue Service, 
and from peer-reviewed academic 
research using the same data source. 
We demonstrate that since the late 
1970s, income inequality has been 
rising in Illinois and that the increase 
has mirrored the increase at the 
national level. We then use standard 
economic forecasting techniques to 
forecast the share of income received 
by households in the top and bottom 
income categories. 
We find that households in the top 
income category are expected to 
receive a greater share of income 
over the next five years but that the 
pace of the increase will be smaller 
than in recent history. Eventually, the 
share is projected to peak and start 
coming down. At the bottom end of 
the income distribution, the share of 
income is predicted to continue to fall 
but at a slower pace than in the past, 
reach a trough and eventually begin to 
go up. Overall, this suggests that the 
changes in the income distribution on 
average over the next five years are not 
expected to be great, implying very 
little effect on the Illinois tax system. 
The next section of the report provides 
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background information about the relationship 
between state personal income tax systems and the 
revenue they generate. Tax revenue is determined by 
the product of the tax rate and the tax base. Tax rates 
are determined by government legislation, while 
the tax base depends upon both government rules 
about what is included and the value of economic 
transactions or aggregates. For the individual income 
tax, the tax base is broadly defined as revenue realized 
by households and small businesses less any income 
that is exempted from taxation by law. A key concept 
in modeling the revenue that will be received from 
any change in tax rates is the responsiveness of the tax 
base, which economists call elasticity. There is a large 
body of scholarly work that measures the extent to 
which households change their behavior in response 
to changes in tax policies. The elasticity of taxable 
income (ETI) is a key measure of the magnitude that 
the tax base will change in response to changes in 
tax rates. Illinois’ recent experience and some more 
rigorous research provides evidence that previous 
increases in Illinois’ tax rates greatly increased its 
revenue and have resulted in some reductions in 
its tax base, at least in the short run. However, the 
evidence also suggests that tax base reductions 
were not large. There is also some evidence in the 
literature that suggests particular classes of taxpayers, 
particularly high income, highly educated and highly 
mobile taxpayers may be more likely to change 
their behavior in response to tax rate increases 
than others. Therefore, we produce a “base” set of 
estimates of revenue generated by the Illinois system, 
the distribution of tax burdens by income category, 
and the revenue and tax burdens of the comparison 
states using an assumption of zero responsiveness of 
the tax base. 
We also generate estimates using assumptions of tax 
base responsiveness suggested by the upper range 
of estimates cited in the academic literature. One can 
think of these as reasonable upper and lower bounds 
of what would happen in the hypothetical scenario of 
changing Illinois’ tax rates.
We used standard tax-policy analysis methodologies 
to develop these estimates. We gathered the best 
available survey data about Illinois residents and 
adjusted it to more closely represent the income 
distribution of Illinois’ resident tax filers in 2016 
(the most recent survey data available). We ran this 
adjusted data through a well-known and widely-used 
tax calculator (Taxsim27), housed at the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), to calculate 
total tax revenue and the distribution of tax burdens 
in Illinois and comparison states.  
Tables 3a and 3b summarize our initial findings, which 
do not include taxpayer responsiveness to changes in 
tax policy. Table 3a shows that the personal income tax 
systems of Illinois and each of the comparison states 
are progressive in the sense that, after accounting for 
deductions, exemptions and credits, median effective 
tax rates rise with income. Illinois is less progressive 
than comparison states because its effective tax rate 
on the lowest income group is higher than comparison 
states and its effective tax rate on the highest income 
groups are lower than comparison states.
Estimates in Table 3b show that Wisconsin, Minnesota 
and Iowa’s tax systems all would generate significantly 
more total revenue than Illinois’ given the same set of 
tax filers, while Missouri’s tax system generates slightly 
less revenue than the Illinois system. Illinois generates 
more revenue from the lowest income group (less 
than $25,000) than Wisconsin or Minnesota but less 
than Iowa and about the same amount as Missouri. 
All four states generate more revenue than Illinois 
from tax filers in the highest income category.
 
We ran two other analyses that estimate what 
will happen if tax filers change their behavior 
in response to changes in the tax system. Both 
analyses build on the research regarding prior 
tax rate changes in Illinois. That prior research 
indicated a substantial responsiveness of the tax 
base, particularly in higher income categories. 
We programmed these results into our analyses and 
report results in Tables 4 and 5.  We find that allowing 
for these behavioral changes does not substantially 
alter our basic conclusions. 
Illinois’ tax system raises less revenue than the tax 
systems of comparison states, except that Missouri 
and Illinois impose a smaller tax burden on the top 
income group than any of the other comparison 
states. The results are more mixed at the bottom 
of the income distribution with Illinois imposing a 
higher tax burden than Wisconsin or Minnesota but a 
lower tax burden than Iowa or Missouri.
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Genesis of this report: Four key questions 
As part of its continuing effort to serve the state, the University of Illinois restructured its system-wide Institute 
of Government and Public Affairs (IGPA) to better integrate the work of faculty from across the system and to 
enhance its capacity to accomplish its mission of improving public policy discussion through non-partisan, 
evidence-based research and public engagement. As part of this restructuring, IGPA is inviting legislative and 
other public policy leaders’ suggestions about the most relevant, appropriate and timely research topics. 
As a result of this process, Illinois State Senator Andy Manar began a dialogue with IGPA researchers regarding 
issues related to Illinois’ personal income tax system. After discussion, Senator Manar and the lead researchers 
agreed that it would be valuable for IGPA to conduct research to answer the questions in Box 1 below. 
We stress that, although the questions were developed in conjunction with Senator Manar, he played no fur-
ther part in the research design, data gathering, analysis or writing of this report. This report represents the 
non-partisan, evidence-based analyses of experienced and independent scholars. The findings reported here 
are solely the responsibility of the authors.
 
Questions posed by Senator Manar
1.  Can you describe the income distribution in Illinois and how this has evolved over the recent past? 
2.  Can you project out the income distribution in Illinois for the next 5 years and project personal income 
tax revenue with: 
 a.  Illinois’ current personal income tax system? 
 b.  A graduated-rate personal income tax system comparable to other Midwest states (e.g. Wisconsin,  
  Minnesota, Iowa or Missouri?
3.  What personal income tax revenue would Illinois ‘ economy generate if it adopted the personal income 
tax structure of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa or Missouri? 
4.   How are tax burdens distributed in the current tax system and how would they be different under 
alternative tax systems in #3 above? 
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Evolution of Illinois’ income 
distribution
Answering Question 1
Characterizing income distributions and measuring 
inequality is an important topic for understanding 
the dynamics of the economy and the relative 
distribution of rewards that come from economic 
activity. Concerns over increasing income inequality 
and the effects of that increase on society have 
permeated the media and political discussion. 
In order to answer the question about the income 
distribution in Illinois and its evolution over time, we 
used data from the economist Mark W. Frank1.
Figure 1, based on Frank’s data, shows the long-term 
trend in the share of income received by the top 10 
percent and top 1 percent of households for both 
the US as a whole and for the state of Illinois. These 
are two of the more commonly cited statistics used 
in describing inequality. The income concept used 
here is adjusted gross income (AGI), which is a broad 
measure of income and is a basic input to the federal 
and most state personal income tax systems.2
United States and Illinois patterns of inequality are 
parallel. Income inequality declined steadily from the 
late-1920s to the late-1970s and then began to rise. 
Also, the gap between the share of income derived 
by the top 1 percent and the top 10 percent widened
Figure 1: Income shares of the top 10 percent and top 1 percent of incomes, 1917-2015
during the earlier period (indicated by the top 1 
percent lines falling by more relative to the top 10 
percent lines). This suggests that the amount of 
income of the 9 percent of households between the 
90th percentile of income (top 10 percent) and the 
99th percentile (top 1 percent) increased. Then that 
gap narrowed again, indicating that that households 
in the top 1 percent of incomes took an increasing 
share, even compared to the next 9 percent.3 
Figure 1 also suggests that the general pattern of 
inequality over time is very similar in Illinois and the 
nation as a whole. Illinois households in the top 10 
percent of incomes did see a slightly greater fall in 
income shares during the immediate post-World War 
II period, but over time the differential has narrowed 
dramatically.
Frank’s data is confined to the distribution of income 
among the top group of income earners, but the 
income distribution below the top 10 percent is also 
important. In order to explore this in more detail, we 
obtained recent summary IRS Statistics of Income 
(SOI) data for the period 1998 to 2016, which reports 
total income and the total number of tax returns filed 
at different levels of AGI. This allows us to construct 
a distribution of income shares received in each 
category of income. Figure 2 shows the results of the 
analysis for the last two decades.
Note: Left axis is income share of Top 1 percent; Right axis is income share of top 10 percent. Source: Frank (2009) and author’s calculations.
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Figure 2: Distribution of income shares, IRS Statistics of Income 
Summary Data, 1998-2016
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income and author’s 
calculations
The data suggest a similar story of increased inequality 
as seen in the Frank data. For tax filers with AGIs of 
more than $200,000 (the blue line), the income share 
rose from a low of just under 23 percent in 2002 to 
over 35 percent in 2016. The share of income received 
by the next group ($100,000-$200,000, the purple 
line) also increased, from 16 percent to just over 25 
percent. 
The income share for the middle income range (green 
line) remained virtually the same, falling by just 1 
percent. The income shares received by the bottom 
two income categories both fell. For the $50,000-
$75,000 AGI range (yellow line), the decline was from 
18 percent of total incomes in 1996 to just under 12 
percent in 2016. 
The largest decline was for households with 
income below $50,000 per year (red line). In 
1998, they received just under 30 percent of 
total household income, by 2016 this figure had 
been nearly halved, to just under 16 percent. 
A commonly used summary measure of income 
inequality is the ratio of shares received by the top 
($200,000 and more) and bottom (under $50,000) 
income categories. In 1998 this ratio was 0.83, 
indicating that the bottom income category actually 
received a greater share of income than the top 
category. By 2016 this ratio had climbed to 2.25. 
Answering Question 2
 
In order to forecast inequality in Illinois incomes, we 
used data on the shares of income received in the 
top and bottom income categories from the SOI. We 
focused on these income categories because that is 
where the greatest recent changes have occurred and 
because this yields a forecast of the top-bottom ratio, 
which, as discussed above, is a widely used measure 
of income inequality. 
We used standard modeling techniques to develop 
our forecasts. We used an “additive” forecasting 
approach, starting with naïve forecasting models 
and smooth the data over time to remove the “peaks 
and valleys” and better identify trends. We also used 
autoregressive models that include relationships 
between the most recent observations and the next 
most recent set of observations, essentially modeling 
how the data develops over time. 
We then added explanatory variables, such as the 
unemployment rate and economic output (state 
GDP), to the model if they increased our ability to 
predict the income shares. The model development 
period (which forecasters call the “in-sample period”) 
was 1998-2013. We assessed the predictive ability by 
creating a testing period of actual data (our “pseudo-
out-of-sample period”) of 2014-2016. 
For the less than $50,000 income category, the best 
fitting model is a second order autoregressive model 
(AR2 – where the contemporaneous value of the 
variable is regressed, i.e. statistically correlated) on 
the most recent prior value and the second most 
recent prior value. 
We included the state unemployment rate as a 
predictor variable. Other variables that we considered 
produced larger testing period errors. Figure 3 shows 
the actual value of the income share in this income 
category over time (red line), and the predicted 
value of that share (blue), along with the 90 percent 
prediction interval (gray “cone” around the forecast 
value), which means that 90 percent of outcomes for 
the future are expected to fall within this range. 
After the red line stops (2016), the remaining years are 
forecast values with uncertainty. The base estimate 
for the share of AGI in the under $50,000 category is
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for a slight decline until it levels off at around 15 
percent of total income. The share is forecast to rise 
slightly in the out-years of our analysis (2023 and 
2024). 
The reason for this pattern is that unemployment is a 
strong predictor of the share of income in the under 
$50,000 income category. The relationship is direct, 
which is what we would expect. (see, e.g., Donovan, 
Labonte, and Dalaker, 2016). Higher unemployment 
predicts more income in the lowest income category 
relative to the other categories because tax filers fall 
into the lowest income category when unemployment 
increases. 
Figure 3: Forecast model results, income category less than $50,000
Our forecast of unemployment, based on economic 
data, predicts a decline until 2020 and a subsequent 
leveling off near its already very low level. Note that 
these results carry with them significant uncertainty. 
The uncertainty is driven by the short time frame of 
the analysis and the difficulty in predicting the trend 
in unemployment. If unemployment unexpectedly 
increases, we would expect the income share of the 
bottom category to rise, whereas if unemployment 
continues its downward trend, the share is predicted 
to fall. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from IRS Statistics of Income data and US Bureau of Labor Statistics (unemployment rate)
The best fitting model for the share of income over 
$200,000 is an AR1 model with unemployment again 
as a predictor. For this category, the relationship is 
inverse; more unemployment leads to a reduction in 
the income share captured by those in the highest 
income category. 
Figure 4  (next page) shows the results. The top income 
category is expected to get more income over the next 
couple of years, with an eventual leveling off due to the 
leveling off of unemployment. There is less uncertainty 
with this forecast than with our forecast of the income 
shares of filers with income less than $50,000, but 
this forecast still exhibits quite a lot of uncertainty. 
Figure 5 (next page) recaps the historical data and 
results from our base forecasting models for the 
income categories under $50,000 (red line) and 
$200,000 or more (blue line) along with the calculated 
top-bottom share. The top-bottom share is predicted 
to rise slightly from 2.25 in 2016 to 2.53 in 2020 and 
then slightly decline to 2.42 by 2024. This data along 
with results of our individual category forecasting 
model indicates a potential “leveling off” of inequality 
in the next few years.
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Figure 4: Forecast model results, income category greater than $200,000
Source: Authors’ calculations from IRS Statistics of Income data and US Bureau of Labor Statistics (unemployment rate)
Figure 5: Income shares for top and bottom income categories and 
top-bottom share ratio, Illinois 1998-2004
the computation of tax revenue would be straight 
forward. Complications enter because the amount of 
tax base available to tax is ultimately determined by 
the behavior of private-sector actors. When tax policy 
changes, private-sector actors may change their 
behaviors. So, these changes must also be considered 
when forecasting revenue from a proposed tax-policy 
change. 
In the case of the personal income tax, households 
make decisions about how much to work, where to 
live, when and in what form to take their income, and 
numerous other things that affect their tax liability. 
Similarly, employers make decisions about how many 
workers to hire, what to pay them, where to locate 
production, and numerous other things that will 
affect the income tax liability of their employees. 
Economists call these behavioral changes “shifting”. 
Note: Left axis is “Share of Total Income;” Right axis is “Top-Bottom Share
Based on these analyses, we do not expect inequality 
to change dramatically over the next few years. In the 
near future, we expect changes in the distribution 
of tax burden by income class to be driven more by 
policy changes than by changes in the underlying 
distribution of income.
Determinants of tax revenue
The amount of revenue that is raised by a tax system 
is determined by the product of the tax rate and the 
tax base. Government legislation sets the tax rate and 
defines the tax base and, if nothing else changed, 
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Relationship between tax revenue and  
elasticity of taxable income (ETI)
Economists have been aware of this issue for many 
years and have done numerous very careful studies 
of tax-policy changes by the US federal government, 
by numerous state governments and in many other 
countries and settings. This research has yielded 
important insights about past experience. 
To measure the cumulative effect of shifting behaviors, 
economists calculate the elasticity of taxable income 
(or ETI) which is the percentage change in the tax 
base—taxable income—as a result of a 1 percent 
change in after-tax earnings from an additional dollar 
of income.  
For example, imagine a household making $50,000 
that reduces its work hours slightly (perhaps by 
working a bit less overtime) so that its taxable income 
falls by $500 when tax rates increase. If the tax increase 
reduced after-tax earnings from the last dollar of 
income by 1 percent, the ETI would be positive 1 
because after-tax income also fell by 1 percent (from 
$50,000 to $49,500). If taxable income instead went 
down by only one-half percent ($250), the ETI would 
be positive 0.5.  
In general, economists expect and nearly always 
find that the ETI will be equal to or greater than zero 
because increases in after-tax earnings as a result of 
reductions in the tax rate stimulate households and 
employers to shift behavior in ways that increase the 
tax base. The reverse is also true. Reductions in after-
tax earnings due to increases in tax rates stimulate 
households and employers to change their behavior 
in ways that diminish the tax base.  
However, the revenue that governments realize may 
rise even if the tax base decreases when tax rates 
increase. For example, if after-tax earnings from the 
last dollar of earnings fall by 5 percent because of a 
tax increase while the taxable income falls by only 1 
percent, total tax revenue will increase because the 
increase in the tax rate more than compensates for 
the fall in the tax base. 
Consider a simple example with a tax base of $100 and 
a tax rate of 5 percent, so that prior to a change in the 
tax rate, total revenue is $100*.05=$5. Suppose that 
the tax rate is increased by 5 percent to 5.25 percent 
and that, because of this increase, the tax base falls by 
1 percent (from 100 to 99, implying an ETI of 0.2). After 
the tax increase, revenue will be $99*.0525=$5.20 for 
an increase of 20 cents.  
When the percentage change in taxable income is 
less than the percentage change in after-tax earnings 
from the last dollar of income (an ETI less than one) 
total revenue will increase as a result of a tax increase. 
If ETI is greater than one, total revenue will decrease 
as a result of a tax increase.
But there is an additional wrinkle when looking at the 
problem from the perspective of a state government. 
When the income tax base declines, both federal 
and state governments may lose revenue because 
there is substantial overlap between federal and 
state income tax bases. Because of this, it is perfectly 
possible that even if the elasticity of taxable 
income is greater than one—even much greater 
than one—total state income tax revenue will 
increase when state income tax rates are increased4. 
 
Recent estimates of ETI
As we explained previously, the elasticity of taxable 
income (or ETI) is a measure of the relationship 
between tax rates and taxable income. A thorough 
understanding of this relationship has been a major 
endeavor of the economics profession. Saez, Slemrod 
and Giertz (2012) is the most recent comprehensive 
review of the relevant literature. After a lengthy 










 While there are no truly convincing estimates of the long-
run elasticity, the best available estimates range from 
0.12 to 0.40...[e]ven at the top of this range the US margial 
top rate is far from the top of the Laffer curve [i.e. the rate 
at which increases in the rate would cause revenue to 
fall.] However...[t]here is much evidence to suggest that 
the ETI is higher for high-income individuals...[research] 
findings highlight the importance of the fact that the ETI 
is not an immutable parameter but can be influenced by 
government policies. For this reason, it is likely to vary 
across countries and within countries over time.
These cautionary notes by some of the world’s 
foremost experts suggest that any prediction 
about the economic effects of changes in tax policy 
should acknowledge considerable uncertainty. 
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of income (i.e. label income as generated in Indiana 
rather than Illinois) without effecting total economic 
output. 
While both types of behaviors are relevant when 
calculating the short run revenue implications of tax-
policy changes, they have very different implications 
for the ultimate economic burden (see Chetty 2009). 
Research also has demonstrated that, in the short run, 
in most cases behavioral change is sufficiently small 
that tax-rate increases (or broadening of tax bases) 
result in substantial revenue increases5.
Thus, for the purposes of this study, it is important 
that we ask how Illinois revenue would respond 
to changes in Illinois tax rates. Fortunately, recent 
experience in Illinois provides some informative 
information about this relationship. 
Figure 6 shows three graphs. The graph in the upper 
left shows Illinois’ (average) personal income tax rate 
in each fiscal year from 1998 to 2018. Until 2010, the 
tax rate was constant but since that time it has varied 
quite a bit—first rising to 5 percent at the start of the 
2011 calendar year and then falling to 3.75 percent at 
the start of the 2015 calendar year and then rising to 
4.95 percent on July 1, 2017 at the start of the 2018 
fiscal year.  
The upper right graph shows Illinois personal income 
tax revenue in each fiscal year from 1998 to 2018.  
 
Of course, the tax rate is only one of many variables 
that also include population growth and the business 
cycle that drive income tax revenue. Despite this, the 
graphs illustrate a clear relationship between income 
tax rates and revenue. During the sustained period 
with a constant 3 percent income tax rate, income tax 
revenue grew slowly. When the income tax rate rose, 
revenue also rose dramatically and when the income 
tax rate fell in 2015, income tax revenue fell as well. 
The lower left graph shows the close relationship 
between percentage changes in the income tax rate 
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Source: U. of Illinois Fiscal Futures Project and Illinois Department of Revenue
Illinois personal income tax rate and revenue
Figure 6:
A large body of relevant research demonstrates 
that tax-policy changes stimulate taxpayers to 
change their behavior in order to reduce their tax 
liability. Behavioral changes are of two main types: 
1) reductions in work effort that have real economic 
consequences and reduce the amount of output 
in the economy and 2) sheltering (or avoidance) 
behaviors that change the form, location or timing
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Illinois taxpayers responded to the 2011 income tax rate 
increase by reducing their reported incomes. The response 
estimated...translates to a state taxable income elasticity 
of 0.72...Analysis of the response across the income 
distribution shows that the aggregate income response 
is driven almost entirely by high-income households...I 
estimate an [ETI] of 0.78 for tax unites in the top decile of 
the income distrubtion...The results also show significant 
reversion following the sunset of the elevated tax rate in 
2015.
Spreen’s result suggests that it is important to pay 
particular attention to how the ETI varies across 
the income distribution. Because higher income 
households tend to have relatively complicated 
sources of earnings including wage and capital 
income, and because these households may be 
relatively mobile and may have a lot of money at 
stake when taxes are levied, their ETI may be different 
than other segments of the population.
Several recent studies have focused on high-income 
households. Young and Varner (2011) study a 2004 
policy in New Jersey that raised the marginal tax rate 
on incomes above $500,000 from 6.37 to 8.97 percent 
(260 basis points) using individual tax records from 
2000 to 2007. This data allowed the authors to identify 
which households did not migrate, migrated out of 
the state, and migrated into the state.  
The authors found that, on average over this period, 
New Jersey experienced net out-migration of 1.2 
percent of tax filing units with incomes over $500,000 
annually. Despite this, the number of tax-filing units 
in this income category increased substantially (43 
percent) because more non-migrating tax-filing units 
obtained this level of income. Net out-migration of 
these very high-income households did increase after 
the 2004 tax increase, but the increase in migration 
was very small relative to the total number of these 
very high-income households. 
For their more sophisticated statistical analysis, Young 
and Varner compare net out-migration of very high 
income (over $500,000) to households with slightly 
less income ($200,000 to $500,000). The households 
with income over $500,000 experienced a substantial 
tax increase which those with slightly lower income 
($200,000 to $500,000) did not. The authors find 
that the tax increase had no impact on the relative 
migration patterns of these two groups.
Young and Varner’s (2011) analysis provoked a 
replication and a substantial criticism by Cohen, Lai, 
and Steindel (2015) and a response by Young and 
Varner (2015). Cohen, Lai, and Steindel (2015) argue 
that Young and Varner’s (2011) results are sensitive 
to several relatively arbitrary assumptions most 
importantly the use of net out-migration rather than 
separately considering in- and out-migration. Young 
and Varner (2015) reply that the replicated results are 
substantively quite similar to their original paper and 
show very small (or zero) increases in out-migration 
from New Jersey’s tax increase on very high-income 
households.
Young et. al (2016) continued research on the topic, 
using administrative tax returns for all million-dollar 
Recent increases and decreases in Illinois’ personal 
income tax rates have been associated with essentially 
one-for-one changes in contemporaneous income 
tax revenue. In recent experience, on average a 10 
percent increase in Illinois’ personal income tax rate 
has been associated with a 10 percent increase in 
Illinois’ personal income tax revenue. This very simple 
analysis suggests little behavioral change in response 
to tax changes (either increases or decreases) and 
a very low ETI. However, some more sophisticated 
analyses suggest caution.
Crosby and Merriman (2016) found that Illinois’ 
economy underperformed compared to its Midwest 
peers after the 2011 increase in the personal and 
corporate income tax rates. After controlling for a 
number of factors, Crosby and Merriman found that, 
compared to a peer group of Midwest states that 
did not raise taxes, Illinois had lower employment, 
higher unemployment rates and lower hours worked 
than expected. They note that Illinois’ relatively poor 
economic performance during this period (January 
2011 through May 2014) could be attributable to 
political dysfunction or other factors not directly 
attributable to the tax increase.
A more recent paper (Spreen 2018) extends the 
analysis of Crosby and Merriman (2016) to also 
consider the sunset of the elevated tax rate in 2015 
and to explicitly estimate the ETI. Spreen’s empirical 
strategy is to create a control group by using a 
weighted average of states that performed in a similar 
way to Illinois prior to the 2011 tax increase. He finds 
(p. 255) that:
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income-earners in the United States over a recent 13-
year period. The authors summarized their findings 
with respect to the effects of state income taxes on 
migration by saying (p.435) “State-to-state millionaire 
migration flows give positive but limited evidence 
of tax migration among top income-earners in the 
United States.” 
In a separate analysis using the same data in the same 
paper, the authors also ask whether very high-income 
households (millionaires) cluster on the low-tax side 
of state borders. They summarize the results of this 
analysis saying (p.439) “we see no evidence of short-
run effects of (modest) tax-policy changes. Even in 
long-run models with larger and long-standing tax 
differences, the evidence that millionaires choose 
to live on the low-tax side of state borders is weak.” 
Overall, they conclude that (p.439) “Millionaire tax 
flight is occurring, but only at the margins of statistical 
and socioeconomic significance”.
Moretti and Wilson (2017) find, however, that one 
group of high earners—star scientists—are both very 
mobile and quite sensitive to tax rates with respect 
to migration decisions. They study scientists who are 
most prolific at obtaining patents. These scientists 
are in high demand and face frequent opportunities 
to move. Moretti and Wilson find that, on average, 
a 1 percent increase in after-tax income in a state 
increases the migration of such scientists by 1.8 
percent in the long run. The authors note that papers 
focusing on star athletes (European soccer players) 
find similar quantitative results.
In summary, there is a voluminous, informative and 
growing literature on the relationship between 
income tax rates and taxable income. While there is 
a great deal of uncertainty, the best available current 
estimates show that, for the US as a whole, increases 
in tax rates substantially increase tax revenue and, 
at least in the short run, cause at most only modest 
declines in the tax base. 
However, experts caution that the impact of any 
particular tax-policy change may vary depending 
upon the circumstances. We know that past increases 
in Illinois’ (flat) income tax rate have resulted in 
substantial increases in revenue but have probably 
resulted in somewhat diminished economic activity. 
Research about increases in taxes on very high-
income households shows that they have little or no 
impact on the location of those households in general 
but that they may have more impact on particular 
types (star scientists or professional athletes) of very 
high-income individuals. 
 
Revenue and Burden Estimates: 
Answering Questions 3 and 4
 
Methodology, Assumptions and Data6
We attempted to investigate these questions using 
standard methodologies in the field. We relied on 
our extensive collective experience working in the 
field as well as a review of recent relevant academic 
literature and consultation with other experts. After 
doing this, we determined that the most appropriate 
approach to answering questions 3 and 4 was to 
develop a data set representing Illinois tax filers and 
to generate estimates of tax liability for each tax-
filing unit in the data set using the National Bureau of 
Economic Research’s (NBER) Taxsim27 program (see 
http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/taxsim27/).  
In order to develop a data set representing Illinois 
tax filers, we gathered the most recent (2016) data 
available from the US Bureau of the Census Current 
Population Survey (CPS) from the IPUMS website 
(https://www.ipums.org/). CPS is a monthly US labor 
force survey covering the period 1962 to the present. 
We used the March 2016 supplement because that 
survey has the most comprehensive data relating 
to income, and we would need this data to estimate 
tax liabilities. We (primarily) used data from CPS 
respondents located in Illinois and after processing 
(explained in more detail below), obtained a sample 
2,365 Illinois tax-filing units.
Taxsim27 is an online tax calculator that allows the user 
to feed in data about tax filers’ sources and amount 
of income, family status, and other related variables. 
Taxsim27 is programmed to receive data on 27 
variables and to estimate federal and state tax 
liabilities, as well as many other associated variables. 
Taxsim27 is (necessarily) simplified relative to 
actual federal and state tax calculations. Its 
results should be viewed as an unbiased estimate 
of actual tax liabilities. Taxsim27 estimates are 
widely used and the results are treated as credible 
by experts in the field of tax-policy analysis. 
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Raw CPS data does not contain information necessary 
to construct all of the 27 variables required by 
Taxsim27. We therefore augmented the CPS data. 
Most importantly, variables for family rent payments 
and mortgage payments are not part of the CPS 
dataset. These are important because they are 
included in the calculation of many state tax credit 
programs. Therefore, we imputed values for these 
variables from the American Community Survey. This 
is an annual national survey of approximately 3.5 
million households designed to provide information 
on social, economic, housing, and demographic 
data (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018, p. 1). It contains 
information on housing costs, including rent and 
mortgage payments. 
Imputation involves the estimation of values that are 
missing in a dataset by using one of several statistical 
approaches. Following Giertz and Ramezani (2018), 
among others, we estimated a “multiple regression” 
statistical model predicting the values of rent and 
mortgage payments in the ACS data. The multiple 
regression model involves the simultaneous 
estimation of the effects of several “predictor” 
variables on one of our variables of interest (rent 
payments or mortgage payments). Our primary 
predictor variables are household income and 
demographics such as the number of children and 
the type of household (marital status and presence of 
other family members). We then collected estimates 
of the effects of those predictor variables on rent 
payments and on mortgage payments and applied 
them to variables existing in the CPS dataset to predict 
the value of rent payments or mortgage payments. 
We used a variable in the CPS dataset that tells us 
whether the respondent rented or owned a home 
to determine whether a mortgage or rent payment 
should be recorded for each tax-filing unit.
Because we wanted to compare the relative 
performance of Illinois’ personal income tax system 
with its potential performance if another state’s tax 
system was adopted, we first calibrated the CPS data 
to match the income distribution of the 2016 Illinois 
resident personal income tax system reported by 
the Illinois Department of Revenue. Calibration, in 
economic analyses, is a process that requires the 
analyst to adjust their data to produce baseline results 
that match a subset of observed phenomena.  
In this case, using techniques explained below, 
we weighted our (CPS) data to approximate the 
distribution and magnitude of adjusted gross income 
(AGI) of Illinois resident filers in 2016. Calibration is 
a widely used, although sometimes controversial, 
technique in economic research; especially economic 
research relating to tax policy (see Hansen and 
Heckman 1996.)
Our calibration procedure can be best understood 
with some explanation of the Illinois personal income 
tax system. Each year, the Illinois Department of 
Revenue (IDOR) releases reports with stratifications of 
individual income tax statistics (https://www2.illinois.
gov/rev/research/taxstats/IndIncomeStratifications/
SitePages/IITStratifications.aspx?rptYear=2016) 
that provide information about the number of tax 
filers, tax liabilities and other information stratified 
by adjusted gross income (AGI) class. A subset of 
the information released by IDOR in 2016 is copied 
in columns (A) through below (G) in Table 1 below. 
As can be seen in the table, about 6.2 million Illinois 
personal income tax returns were filed in 2016. In 
total, these returns reported AGI of about $665 billion 
and tax liabilities of about $14.1 billion. Statistics for 
five AGI stratifications of Illinois resident tax filers are 
presented, ranging from less than $25,000 to more 
than $500,000. 
Total returns, AGI and tax liabilities of non-Illinois 
returns (those without valid zip codes) are also 
reported. About 91 percent of tax returns have a valid 
Illinois address. Illinois returns account for about 92 
percent of tax liabilities but only about 63 percent of 
AGI. Clearly non-Illinois returns, which account for 37 
percent of AGI but only 8 percent of tax liability, are 
very different from Illinois returns. This makes sense 
because it is likely that non-Illinois filers earned only a 
portion of their income from Illinois-related activities 
and are therefore subject to the Illinois personal 
income tax on only a portion of their income.
Unfortunately, we do not have representative 
data about these non-Illinois filers. Even if we did, 
Taxsim27 is not programmed to compute liabilities 
for non-resident filers. Because of this, we restricted 
our analysis to resident Illinois filers who represent 91 
percent of tax filers and 92 percent of tax liabilities. 
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The appendix shows that, based on data released by 
IDOR, changes in the tax paid by non-Illinois filers 
closely tracked changes in the tax paid by Illinois 
filers. Because of this we are confident that the results 
of this study with respect to tax revenue are not 
sensitive to the exclusion of non-resident filers.
Information about our calibrated sample data is 
presented in columns (H) through (J) in Table 1.  We 
were able to weight the sample we obtained from 
CPS to nearly exactly match IDOR data on share of 
tax returns in each AGI category and share of AGI in 
each AGI category. As mentioned above, Taxsim27 
provides an estimate rather than an exact calculation 
of tax liability since it does not have access to the 
many individual circumstances that could influence a 
filer’s tax liability. 
Thus, even though our calibrated data is a close 
match to IDOR values for number of returns and AGI, 
Taxsim27’s estimates of tax liabilities by AGI class is 
not a perfect match to observed IDOR tax liabilities 
by AGI class. This slight variance from observed data 
should not affect our conclusions about relative 
tax revenue (by AGI class) from comparison states 
(Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa or Missouri). 
We ran the same set of data through Taxsim27 
for Illinois and each of the comparison states so 
that conclusions about the relative cross-state tax 
revenue and distributions of burdens by AGI class 
do not depend upon exactly matching the observed 
distribution of Illinois tax burdens by AGI class.
We note one further adjustment to our data. In tax 
year 2016, Illinois’ personal income tax rate was 3.75 
percent. This rate was increased to 4.95 percent on July 
1, 2017. Taxsim27 is not yet programmed to calculate 
2018 tax liabilities, but we wanted to compare the 
amount of revenue raised by Illinois’ 2018 tax system 
with the amount of revenue that would be raised by 
the comparison states if tax liabilities for the same 
group of taxpayers were calculated using their tax 
system. Therefore, we calculated Illinois’ 2018 tax 
revenues by multiplying the Taxsim27 generated tax 
liabilities by the ratio (4.95/3.75)7. 
Comparisons of state income tax systems can be 
broken into two parts: comparisons of tax rates 
and comparisons of tax bases. While it is relatively 
straightforward to compare tax rates, comparison of 
tax bases can be complex. 
 
Most states begin with federal definitions of AGI 
but then define their own system of exemptions, 
deductions and credits. An exemption may exclude 
certain types of income (e.g. military or religious
income) from the tax system while a deduction allows 
the tax filer to reduce their reported income by a 
certain amount. A credit—child care for example—




Often deductions and credits can depend on family 
situation (e.g. single or married), age, occupation, 
etc. Both deductions and credits may be phased 
out as reported income increases. Because of these 
complexities, simple cross-state comparisons 
of rates can give a misleading impression of the 
relationship between income and tax liabilities. 
 
Table 2 below presents some very basic information 
about the 2016 personal income tax systems of the 
states considered in this analysis. Our analysis using 
Taxsim27 considers tax rates, tax exemptions and tax 
credits and is a much more complete portrayal of the 
tax system than it is possible to incorporate in Table 2. 
More complete and detailed tax system comparisons 
are presented in Minnesota Center for Fiscal Excellence
(2017) and Olin and Swain (2017) and updated tax 
rate information is presented in Loughead and Wei 
(2019).
A quick perusal of Table 2 demonstrates how a 
simple comparison of tax rates can be misleading. 
For the lowest income group (zero to $25,180) of 
single filers, Minnesota’s tax rate of 5.35 percent 
is higher than the tax rate on the lowest income 
filers in each of the four other states. However, 
comparisons that take into account not only tax 
rates but also detailed consideration of tax bases 
show that Minnesota taxes low-income households 
less than almost any other state in the nation (see 
Minnesota Center for Fiscal Excellence 2017 and 
Wiehe, et al. 2018) because of its system of substantial 




Our approach to comparing tax systems combines 
detailed information on tax bases of representative 
filers with information about tax rates, tax credits 
and tax exemptions that is programed into Taxsim27. 
We first present results of our empirical analyses in 
Tables 3a and 3b (next page) assuming that tax filers 
do not change their behavior when tax rates change. 
Table 3a (next page) shows median effective tax rates 
(calculated as tax liabilities/ AGI) for each state and 
AGI stratification. Median effective tax rates (ETRs) 
rise with AGI in all four comparison states as well as 
Illinois. 
 
Thus, even though Illinois currently has a flat tax rate, 
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the system is somewhat progressive (average tax rates 
increase with income) because of Illinois’ allowance 
for personal exemptions. The four comparison states 
are all more progressive than Illinois in the sense that 
their median effective rate on the lowest AGI category 
is lower than in Illinois, and their effective rate on their 
highest income category is higher than in Illinois. 
A slightly different way of looking at the same 
underlying data is shown in Table 3b. This table is 
a direct response to question 3 and shows the tax 
revenue (relative to Illinois) raised in total, and for 
each AGI stratification, when a representative group 
of Illinois tax filers is subjected to the tax systems of 
four other states. In Table 3b, the value in each cell 
gives the ratio of the revenue Illinois would collect if it 
adopted the comparison state’s tax system compared 
to the revenue it collects under its current tax system. 
A cell value greater than 100 percent means Illinois’ 
revenue would rise for that AGI group if it adopted 
the comparison state’s tax system and a value less 
than 100 percent means revenue would fall.
As shown in the “total” (bottom) row of the table, 
Wisconsin, Minnesota and Iowa all generate 
significantly more total revenue than Illinois when 
confronted with the same set of tax filers. Missouri’s 
tax system generates 99 percent of the revenue 
generated by Illinois. As we look across the AGI 
distribution, Illinois generates more from the lowest 
income group (less than $25,000) than Wisconsin 
or Minnesota. Minnesota’s exemptions and credits 
actually combine to generate negative net revenue 
from this group—the average low-income filer in 
Minnesota gets a subsidy rather than paying a tax. 
Low-income taxpayers in Iowa contribute more 
revenue than those in Illinois while the burden in 
Missouri is quite similar. Illinois taxes on the next 
group of tax filers (AGI of $25,000 to $50,000) are 
considerably higher than those in the other four 
states and are triple the amount in Minnesota. Tax 
burdens between $50,000 and $100,000 are similar 
to Illinois across the four states with somewhat lower 
taxes in Minnesota and Missouri. Taxes on filers with 
AGI above $100,000 are higher than Illinois in all four 
states and nearly twice as high in Minnesota.
 
The calculations in both Tables 3a and 3b implicitly 
assume that tax filers’ income would not change 
if relative tax rates were altered. A large body of 
economic research (some of which is discussed 
earlier in this report) finds that taxpayers often do 
change their behavior in response to changes in tax 
policy. That research stresses the finding that tax filers’ 
reactions can vary depending on the circumstances 
of the tax system and can be difficult to predict. While 
Table 3a Table 3b
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we acknowledge this high degree of uncertainty, 
we believe it can be informative to present revenue 
calculations that incorporate the potential for 
behavioral reactions to tax-rate changes.
Spreen’s (2018) analyses of tax-base changes in 
reaction to Illinois’ 2011 and 2015 tax-rate changes 
provide helpful guidance about the potential 
magnitude of behavioral changes in Illinois in 
response to tax-rate changes. Spreen finds a taxable 
income elasticity of 0.72 overall, meaning that a 
1 percent change in after-tax earnings from an 
additional dollar of income results in a 0.72 percent 
change in the tax base. 
Of course, we might expect that behavioral reactions 
to tax-rate changes would differ across the income 
distribution and Spreen finds that “the aggregate 
response is driven almost entirely by high-income 
households...[filers in the top decile (10 percent) of 
the income distribution have]...state taxable income 
elasticity of 0.78.” Economic theory (see mathematical 
appendix) allows us to recalculate relative revenue 
from Illinois’ current (2016 modified to 2018 tax 
rate) system and revenue from other states’ tax 
systems incorporating Spreen’s elasticity estimates. 
Table 4 incorporates Spreen’s finding of an overall 
elasticity of taxable income (ETI) of 0.72 and assumes 
that all tax filers have this identical ETI. Comparing 
the results shown in Tables 3a and 4 we can see that, 
when we allow for this behavioral response to tax-
rate changes the total revenue raised by other states 
is nearly unchanged compared to Illinois. 
There are two reasons for this. First, even with 
the relatively high ETI estimated by Spreen the 
percentage change in taxable income will be relatively 
small because the state tax increase (resulting from 
moving from Illinois to other states) is small relative 
to the total (federal plus state) tax rate. For example, 
Illinois’ 2011 tax increase from 3 to 5 percent was a 
60 percent increase in the state tax rate but only a 5 
percent increase in the total federal plus state tax rate 
for a tax filer that faced a 37 percent federal income 
tax rate on the last dollar earned. 
A second reason to expect a small impact on total 
revenue when we allow for behavioral change is that 
moving tax filers from Illinois’ tax system to other 
states’ tax systems will generally decrease tax rates 
for some while increasing tax rates for others. Those 
tax filers who get a reduced tax rate are predicted to 
react by increasing their work effort (and therefore 
taxable income) and this can offset part, or all, of the 
decrease in taxable income by tax filers who reduce 
work effort and taxable income.
These offsetting effects are visible by comparing 
Tables 3b and 4. When we allow for behavioral 
change by incorporating an ETI of 0.72, the relative 
tax revenue generated by the lowest AGI group grows 
in all four states. For example, in Table 3b (with no 
behavioral change assumed, i.e. an ETI of 0) the lowest 
AGI group in Wisconsin generated only 52 percent as 
much revenue as in Illinois but in Table 4, where we 
allow for the fact that that group might work more 
if it faced a lower tax rate, it generated 98 percent of 
Illinois’ revenue under the Wisconsin tax system.  
We can see the opposite effect at the top end 
of the AGI distribution. In Table 3b, the top AGI 
group generated 141 percent of Illinois’ revenue 
under Wisconsin’s tax system. When we allow for 
behavioral change so that this high-AGI group of 
taxpayers might increase tax avoidance or evasion 
under Wisconsin’s higher tax rate, only 137 percent 
of Illinois’ tax revenue is generated. The same basic 
picture holds for other states and, in particular, 
refunds (negative tax payments) to the lowest AGI 
Table 4
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group fall in Minnesota due to behavioral change. 
Recall, however, that Spreen found that behavioral 
changes were largely confined to the highest-income 
tax filers who probably have the greatest mobility 
and the greatest ability to reconfigure their incomes 
to minimize tax burdens. 
To quantify the potential impact of behavioral change 
confined to the top income group in response to 
tax-policy change, Table 5 assumes a zero ETI for 
the bottom 90 percent of the AGI distribution but, 
consistent with Spreen’s empirical finding, an ETI of 
0.78 for the top decile (10 percent) of the income 
distribution. 
Comparing Table 5 and Table 3b, we see that the 
assumption of behavioral changes by the top 
income group causes only a small drop in the 
revenue generation of these four states. For example, 
Wisconsin’s revenue falls from 115 percent to 114 
percent of Illinois’ when we allow for behavioral 
change in the top income group in response to tax-
policy change. The change is somewhat larger in 
Minnesota, but the total effect is still quite small.
Summary
In summary, our empirical analyses suggest that, 
compared to the four neighboring states, Illinois’ tax 
system collects less revenue and the revenue that 
Illinois does collect comes disproportionately from 
the lowest income categories compared to the other 
states. Allowing for behavioral change in response to 
tax-policy changes does not alter, and under some 




Comparing overtime changes in AGI and tax 
revenue from Illinois and non-Illinois returns
As noted in the text, we lacked sufficient data about 
returns filed by non-Illinois filers to estimate the tax 
liabilities of these filers were Illinois to adopt the tax 
system of the other states considered in our report. We 
wondered whether the elasticity of taxable income 
(ETI) of these non-Illinois filers might be significantly 
different from the ETI of Illinois filers. In particular, 
some readers might be concerned that non-Illinois 
filers might have a significantly higher ETI than Illinois 
filers and hence might have the flexibility to escape 
Illinois taxation should Illinois tax rates rise. 
We hope to shed some light on this question by 
looking at the historical record.  Each year since 
2008, the Illinois Department of Revenue has 
posted data about the observed total AGI and 
tax payments of Illinois and non-Illinois filers. 
Figure A1 shows a graph of the raw data over time. 
The total AGI in both groups has been growing over 
time, as have the total tax payments.  There was an 
obvious and substantial growth in tax payments by 
Illinois returns when the tax rate increased from 3 to 
5 percent in 2011. There was also an increase in tax 
payments by non-Illinois returns at that time, but 
precise relationship is difficult to see in Figure A1 
because of the difference in scale between Illinois 
and non-Illinois returns.  
Figure A2 (next page) allows more direct comparison 
by showing the percentage changes in AGI and tax 
payments for Illinois and non-Illinois returns. The 
figure on the left clearly shows that the AGI of non-
Illinois returns is much more volatile than the AGI of 
Illinois returns. In some years, the growth in AGI for 
non-Illinois returns has exceeded 50 percent while 
it has been substantially negative in other years. 
AGI reported on Illinois returns fluctuates in a much 
narrower range. 
Despite this, the graph on the right shows that the 
percentage change in tax liabilities of Illinois and 
non-Illinois returns closely track each other. When 
tax payments of Illinois returns grew substantially 
following the 2011 tax increase, tax payments of non-
Illinois returns grew in parallel and actually increased 
at a slightly faster pace compared with tax payments 
of Illinois returns. 
When the tax rate increase started to expire in 2015, 
the rate of growth of tax payments fell substantially 
(and in parallel) for both Illinois and non-Illinois 
returns. This preliminary evidence suggests that, 
based on the historical experience, there is currently 
no reason to believe that the ETI of non-Illinois returns 
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Denote that subscript 𝑆𝑆 and 𝐹𝐹 refer to State and Federal, respectively.  
Denote that subscript 𝑁𝑁 and 𝑂𝑂 refer to New and Old, respectively.  
 
Assuming that only state marginal tax rate (𝜏𝜏&) changes from 𝜏𝜏'& to 𝜏𝜏(&.  
Federal marginal tax rate (𝜏𝜏)) keeps constant.  
Denote that 𝜀𝜀+,- is the elasticity of taxable income (ETI). Then we have:  
𝜀𝜀_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = (	%Δ𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵)/(	%Δ(1 − 𝜏𝜏_𝑆𝑆 − 𝜏𝜏_𝐹𝐹	)	) = (Δ𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵/〖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵〗_𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆	)/(Δ(1 − 𝜏𝜏_𝑆𝑆 − 𝜏𝜏_𝐹𝐹	)/(1 − 𝜏𝜏_𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆 −
𝜏𝜏_𝐹𝐹	)) = Δ𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵/Δ(1 − 𝜏𝜏_𝑆𝑆 − 𝜏𝜏_𝐹𝐹	)			(1 − 𝜏𝜏_𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆 − 𝜏𝜏_𝐹𝐹)/〖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵〗_𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆	,    (1) 
Δ𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(& − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵'&,      (2) 
Δ(1 − 𝜏𝜏& − 𝜏𝜏)) = (1 − 𝜏𝜏(& − 𝜏𝜏)) − (1 − 𝜏𝜏'& − 𝜏𝜏)) = 𝜏𝜏'& − 𝜏𝜏(&,   (3) 
where 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵'& is the income tax base (taxable income) before the state marginal tax rate change. 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(& is the income tax base (taxable income) after the state marginal tax rate change. 
 
Also, note that  
 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅A = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵& ∗ 𝜏𝜏&,       (4) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅A is the amount of revenue from state taxes and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵A is the state tax base. 
 
Therefore, the change in revenue when the tax rate changes is  
Δ𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅A = 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅(& − 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅'&,      (5) 
Δ𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅A = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(& ∗ 𝜏𝜏(& − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵'& ∗ 𝜏𝜏'&,     (6) 
 




Therefore, we have:  




 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(& = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵'& ∗ K1+ 𝜀𝜀+,- ∗
C(DEFGEFH)
DEFIGEFH
L      (7) 
 
Plug (7) into Eq.(6), we have:  
Δ𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅A = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵'& ∗ K1+ 𝜀𝜀+,- ∗
C(DEFGEFH)
DEFIGEFH
L ∗ 𝜏𝜏(& − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵'& ∗ 𝜏𝜏'&, 











− 1O (because of Eq.(4)), 





− 1O (because of Eq.(3)).  
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1     In 2009, Frank published a paper (Frank 2009) documenting one of the first attempts to construct a large-scale dataset of state in-
come distribution measures over a long period of time. Up to that point, most of the state inequality data was only available during census years 
(1980, 1990, etc.). Frank constructed a consistent time series of data going back to 1917 using data published in the U.S. Internal Revenue Service 
Statistics of Income (SOI) series (https://www.irs.gov/statistics). Since publication of his research, Frank has maintained a dataset available on the 
web (https://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html). The most recent year of data available is 2015. Frank’s data is confined to the distribution 
of income among the top group of income earners. Because we were also interested in income shares throughout the income distribution, we 
also collected our own data from SOI during the period 1998 to 2016.
2  It should be noted that this definition of income is not universally accepted. Both Burkhauser, et.al. (2012) and Auten and Splinter 
(forthcoming) use different definitions of income and find different magnitudes of the inequality changes since the late 1970s. However, the 
general shape of the time-trend of income distribution is the same in their work and the measure used by Frank and others (e.g., Piketty, Saez 
and Zucman (2018) is the more commonly cited one.
3  Elsewhere, Piketty, Saez and Zucman (2018, Table II) find that for the period 1980-2014, pre-tax incomes for households in the top 1 
percent of incomes grew by 205 percent while pre-tax incomes for the top 10 percent grew by 121 percent, a rate just over one-half as fast (the 
incomes of the top 0.001 percent of households grew by 636 percent while the incomes of households in the bottom 50 percent grew by just 1 
percent). 
4  Consider a simple example showing that state tax revenue may increase even when total (federal plus state) tax revenue declines. 
Suppose that the initial tax base is $100. The federal tax rate on the last dollar of income earned by high income earners is 37 percent and the 
state tax rate on income is 5 percent so that the combined rate is 42 percent. Federal revenue prior to the state changing its tax rate would be 
$37 while state revenue is $5. Suppose that the ETI is very high – say 2.0. Now the state enacts an income tax increase to 6 percent. This implies 
that the overall marginal tax rate increases from 42 percent to 43 percent, and after-tax income from the last dollar earned falls from 58 to 57 
cents—a decrease of 1.75 percent. With an ETI of 2.0, the tax base will decrease by two times 1.75 percent or 3.5 percent to $96.50. 
Since the federal tax rate did not change, federal government revenue will fall (to $35.70=37 percent*96.50), but state government revenue will 
increase to $5.79. An increase in the state tax rate has therefore caused total (federal plus state) revenue to decline (from $42 to $41.49) but state 
revenue has actually increased. In essence, the fact that the federal and state governments tax overlapping bases has made it easier for state 
governments to raise tax rates while not losing state revenue. Even when the total income tax base is quite elastic—that is it falls rapidly when 
income tax rates increase—state revenue can increase substantially with increases in state income tax rates. In this case, the ETI would have to 
be greater than 9.5 for state tax revenue to fall after the tax-rate change
5  Recent methodologically sophisticated studies by Weber (2014) and Burns and Ziliak (2016) estimate ETIs (0.858 and 0.4 to 0.55, 
respectively) that are greater than the “best available estimates” in Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012). Both Weber (2014) and Burns and Ziliak 
(2016) acknowledge a range of possible estimates depending on the precise statistical formulation that they use to obtain the estimates. Each 
of these studies estimates the ETI for the aggregate of all (state and federal) tax rates on income. As explained above however, even if income is 
quite elastic with respect to the total tax rate (i.e. the ETI exceeds 1) it may be possible to substantially increase the state tax rate and to obtain a 
substantial increase in state tax revenue. 
6  Bruno and Manzo (2019) analyze related questions using quite different methodologies.  
7  We are unable to take into account changes in state tax revenue and state tax liabilities by AGI stratification as a result of the Tax Cut 
and Jobs Act (TCJA), which took effect in the beginning of the 2018 calendar year. Although the TCJA directly affected federal tax policy it may 
have had an indirect effect on state tax policy because many states link the definitions of their tax policies to federal tax policies (See Auxier and 
Sammartino 2018). We cannot directly calculate state tax-policy changes in reaction to the TCJA because, as of late April 2019 Taxsim27 had not 
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